Building resilience in urban drainage systems requires consideration of a wide range of threats that contribute to urban flooding. Existing hydraulic reliability based approaches have been focused on quantifying functional failure caused by extreme rainfall or increase in dry weather flows that lead to hydraulic overloading of the system. Such approaches however, do not fully explore the full system failure scenario space due to exclusion of crucial threats such as equipment malfunction, pipe collapse and blockage that can also lead to urban flooding. In this research, a new analytical approach based on global resilience analysis is investigated and applied to systematically evaluate the performance of an urban drainage system when subjected to a wide range of structural failure scenarios resulting from random cumulative link failure. Link failure envelopes, which represent the resulting loss of system functionality (impacts) are determined by computing the upper and lower limits of the simulation results for total flood volume (failure magnitude) and average flood duration (failure duration) at each link failure level. A new resilience index that combines the failure magnitude and duration into a single metric is applied to quantify system residual functionality at each considered link failure level. With this approach, resilience has been tested and characterized for an existing urban drainage system in Kampala city, Uganda. In addition, the effectiveness of potential adaptation strategies in enhancing its resilience to cumulative link failure has been tested.
σ standard deviation structure and patterns of behaviour (i.e. to persist) through absorbing shocks or disturbances 7 roughness (Atkinson et al., 2014; Trifunovic, 2012) . In urban drainage systems however, 118 most quantitative studies tend to focus on investigating hydraulic reliability which only 119 considers functional failures such as occurrence of extreme rainfall or increasing dry weather 120 flows (Sun et al., 2011; Thorndahl and Willems, 2008) . The main short coming of such 121 approaches is that the full system failure scenario space that includes other causes of surface 122 flooding such as equipment failure, sewer collapse and blockage is not explored. 123 It is recognised that different threats or combinations of threats such as extreme rainfall or 124 sewer failure could lead to the same failed state (i.e. surface flooding). Therefore, by only 125 considering a narrow range of hydraulic failures, current approaches take a limited view of 126 functional resilience with no due consideration given to structural resilience. Further 127 research is needed to develop new quantitative approaches that explicitly consider all possible 128 failure scenarios in order to holistically evaluate resilience in UDSs (Butler et al., 2014;  evaluating the effect of different sewer failures modes and extent, irrespective of their 144 occurrence probability, on the ability of an UDS to minimise the resulting flooding impacts 145 (e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009) . properties that determine the resulting loss of functionality when the system is subjected to 150 increasing failure levels. Finally, a new resilience index, Res o that quantifies system residual 151 functionality as a function of failure magnitude and duration is computed at each failure level 152 for both the existing system and for the tested adaptation strategies. 153 2. Methods
Global resilience analysis (GRA) approach 154
Global resilience analysis is applied to characterise the performance of an existing UDS when 155 subject to a wide range of structural failure scenarios involving random cumulative link 156 failure. Structural failure in an UDS can be modelled by removal of components for example failing links randomly ensures that all links, N in the system have an equal probability of 165 being removed (Johansson and Hassel, 2012 194 Model simulations are carried out at each randomly generated link failure level and system therefore provide vital information about the resilience properties of the system being tested.
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If the resulting envelope covers solutions with lower impacts at all link failure levels, then the 230 resulting loss of system functionality is minimised during the considered failure scenarios. If 231 the resulting envelope covers solutions with higher impacts and with a larger range between 232 the minimum and maximum values, the tested system exhibits higher loss of system after occurrence of a given threat that lead to system failure (Equation 1).
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Where t f is the failure duration, t o the time of occurrence of the threat, and t n the total elapse 246 time. Equation 1 above is further simplified by assuming that the system failure and recovery 247 curve is rectangular (Equation 2)
The resilience index, Res o , which is a measure of system residual functionality, is estimated 250 as one minus the computed volumetric severity and is computed at each link failure level
Where V TF is the total flood volume, V TI the total inflow into the system, t f the mean duration (Table A .1) respectively. The existing system is not 285 always clean in a 'business as usual' case. This was reflected in the SWMM model by taking 286 the initial value of Manning's n as 0.020 which is the upper limit of the recommended range 287 (i.e. 0.010 -0.020) for concrete lined channels. Figure A.2b) . The DS strategy models upstream distributed source control. 
Simulation and performance assessment of the existing UDS
In order to test the performance of the modelled existing UDS, simulations were carried out 309 and flows were investigated at selected links in the system (Figure 4) . The hydraulic data on 310 the selected open channel cross sections is presented in Table A. that failure of just 10% of links leads to a disproportionately large increase of 91% in total 331 flood volume (Figure 5a ). Thereafter, further increase in the percentage of failed links leads 332 to comparatively small increases in the total flood volume.
The situation is very different for nodal flood duration, where results show failure of 10% of 334 links leads to just a 6% increase (Figure 5b) . Globally, the results indicate that the failure 335 duration increases from 41 minutes to 56 minutes representing an increase of 36.2% when all 336 the links in the system are failed. 337 3.5 Effect of adaptation strategies on system performance 338 The GRA methodology is applied to test each of the proposed UDS adaptation strategies. An 339 additional 16,400 link failure scenarios are simulated for the CS and DS strategies 340 respectively that is, a total of 32,800 generated from a total of 400 random link failure 341 sequences ( Figure A.4) . The effect of the CS strategy is a slight reduction of flood volume 342 which occurs at lower link failure levels less than 60% with very little impact on flood 343 duration at all failure levels. Globally, it results in a 3.4% reduction of total flood volume and 344 a 1.1% increase in mean duration of flooding ( Figure 5 ).
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On the other hand, the DS strategy results in a significant reduction of 32% total flood 346 volume at all considered link failure levels. At link failure levels greater than 20% any 347 additional increase in link failure levels leads to minimal increase in total flood volume. The 348 strategy also reduces the mean nodal flooding duration from 48 minutes to 35 minutes giving 349 a reduction of 27% for all considered link failure scenarios. Table 3 details the key statistics 350 of the GRA results for the existing system and for the considered resilience strategies. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the considered adaptation strategies, the generated 366 link failure envelopes are plotted into one graph to map out the failure space common to all 367 (Figure 7) . Comparing the results of the CS strategy to those of the existing system, a slight 368 downward shift of both the maximum and minimum flood volume failure envelopes is 369 observed at lower link failure levels (< 40%), which represents the effect of the strategy in 370 minimising the magnitude of flooding. However, there is no significant effect at higher link 371 failure levels. Also, the results suggest that the CS strategy has minimal effect on the flood 372 duration failure envelopes.
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For the DS strategy, a significant downward shift in the flood volume failure envelope (i.e. a 374 reduction in the magnitude of flooding) is observed link failure envelope at all cumulative 375 link failure levels. The strategy also limits the additional increase in flood volume for link 376 failure levels beyond 33% i.e. a flattening of the flood volume failure envelope is observed at 377 higher link failure levels. The strategy also shifts the flood duration failure envelopes 
